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Pork Packer Procurement and Merchandising Practices, 2000
Abstract
Hog procurement practices are expected to continue to evolve toward tighter coordination systems to satisfy
pork retailers and final consumers for consistently high-quality, safe pork products. More demanding
consumers are encouraging more branded retail and food service products that entail both brand loyalty and
product liability. Packers report success in acquiring leaner, higher yielding hogs through coordinated systems
than are generally available through traditional cash market channels. Packers report that hogs they produce
themselves address the concerns of quality, consistency, and safety as well or better than market contract hogs
produced by others. Although capturing the profits in the production sector, packers admit that their own
hogs are not lower cost than hogs from producers. It appears that the increased quality control afforded the
integrated packer is sufficient to offset possible higher costs of producing their own hogs.
From the other end of the pork chain, producers are asking for marketing agreements to secure financing to
continue in hog production or to expand, and for purchasing programs that reward leaner, higher yielding
hogs. Many producers are reluctant to adopt new technologies and invest in new facilities and genetics
without a formal arrangement to market output. In an increasingly risky agricultural market place, long-term
marketing agreements are a private sector response to a particular widespread problem—producing without a
place to sell.
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Summary and Implications
Hog procurement practices are expected to continue to
evolve toward tighter coordination systems to satisfy pork
retailers and final consumers for consistently high-quality,
safe pork products. More demanding consumers are
encouraging more branded retail and food service products
that entail both brand loyalty and product liability. Packers
report success in acquiring leaner, higher yielding hogs
through coordinated systems than are generally available
through traditional cash market channels. Packers report that
hogs they produce themselves address the concerns of
quality, consistency, and safety as well or better than market
contract hogs produced by others. Although capturing the
profits in the production sector, packers admit that their own
hogs are not lower cost than hogs from producers. It appears
that the increased quality control afforded the integrated
packer is sufficient to offset possible higher costs of
producing their own hogs.
From the other end of the pork chain, producers are
asking for marketing agreements to secure financing to
continue in hog production or to expand, and for purchasing
programs that reward leaner, higher yielding hogs. Many
producers are reluctant to adopt new technologies and invest
in new facilities and genetics without a formal arrangement
to market output. In an increasingly risky agricultural
market place, long-term marketing agreements are a private
sector response to a particular widespread
problem—producing without a place to sell.
Introduction
Dramatic changes are taking place in the way pork
packers procure hogs from producers. In 1993, 87% of
slaughter hogs were purchased in the cash market (Rhodes,
Grimes, Hayenga, and Lawrence). By early 2000, it was
estimated that this number has fallen to 25% (Grimes and
Meyer). Leading pork packers were surveyed to better
understand the types of procurement practices used by
packers and the motivations for evolving away from cash
market transitions.
Materials and Methods
Thirteen of the nation’s largest pork processors were
surveyed in April 2000 regarding their procurement and
merchandising activity for 1999. These processors were
telephoned, asked to participate in the study, and were faxed
a survey form. Eleven of the 13 processors completed the
survey and returned it. Processors answered the questions
based either on calendar year 1999 actual results or with
adjustments reflecting recent acquisitions and practices.
Drawing upon the survey results and other public
information, future trends also are considered.
Results and Discussion
Packer purchasing arrangements. Collectively, the 11
responding firms accounted for 77% of the 101 million hogs
processed in 1999. These firms report purchasing 27% of the
hogs they bought for processing in the cash market in 19991
(Table 1). Formula agreements based on the cash market
represented 32% of the purchases. Agreements with some
type of risk management or cash flow smoothing feature
accounted for approximately 22% of the purchases. Although
modest changes in procurement methods are expected by
2004, recent trends are expected to continue. In 1996 these
packers bought 59% of their hogs on the open market. This
figure fell to below 30% in 1999 and is expected to decline
more by 2004, resulting in a smaller cash market because
more hogs will be purchased on formula-priced contracts.
The packers surveyed also produced hogs for their own
plants, and in some cases for competitors. The survey
respondents produced the equivalent of approximately 17%
of 1999 U.S. hog slaughter, and 22% of their slaughter
volume. However, 21% of the hogs produced by a packer or
its subsidiary were processed by a competing packer. So the
volume of their own hogs going through their slaughter
plants was approximately 18% of their slaughter (as of
spring 2000). Some production units are not located near a
company-owned packing plant, or are operated as separate
profit centers making their independent marketing decisions,
or are operating under preexisting contracts with others. The
                                                
1 Grimes and Meyer reported slightly lower cash market
reliance, based on a smaller set of respondents, adding their
estimates of three nonrespondents’ purchasing practices, and
including some transfer price systems from hog-producing
subsidiaries in their calculations. In our survey, some
packers also may have reported the transfer price method for
hogs produced within the company or by a subsidiary, and
reported them as self-produced.
Table 1. Hog procurement methods, 1999.
Procurement method Percent
Cash market purchase, live basis
Cash market purchase, carcass basis
Formula-priced contract based on cash
 market
Fixed price contract based on futures
Fixed agreement based on feed price
Formula contract with window
Other purchase methods
Self production
Total
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smaller number of packers responding to questions about the
future expected to produce more than 10% more hogs in
2004 than they do currently and process a higher percentage
of their hogs in their plants.
Motivations. Motivations for the use of long-term
marketing agreements were driven primarily by their need
for a consistent supply of quality hogs and higher quality
hogs (Table 2). The ability to assure food safety was rated
next most important, receiving a ranking of 3.8 on a 5-point
scale. Reducing plant-operating expenses, search cost for
hogs, and week-to-week supply/price risk all rated 3.5.
Long-run price risk management (3.0) and the ability to
purchase hogs at lower prices (2.3) rated considerably below
quality issues. All motivations for contracting (except
buying hogs at lower prices) are expected to become more
important by 2004.
Self-production of hogs by packers had slightly different
motivations. In general, ensuring pork quality and safety,
plant efficiency, and long-run price risk management were
higher-ranked reasons for self-production than for marketing
contracts. Producing hogs was rated lower on both week-to-
week supply management and on lower price of hogs.
Packers admit that they do not lower the cost of hogs
processed by producing them, and place only moderate
importance on profits that can be captured by producing
hogs. The ability to secure consistently safe, high-quality
hogs is more important to packers than are efficiency and
price considerations.
In an open-ended question about the driving forces
toward tighter coordination, packers added another
important element to the quality, consistency, and food
safety list. More than half of the packers identified the
demand by producers as the driving force for packers offering
and entering into more long-term contracts. Producers’
reasons for wanting an ongoing relationship were reportedly
to assure market access, share information about consumer
concerns, and secure financing for their operations. Packers
also noted that knowing where their supplies were coming
from and their likely quality allowed them to enter into
agreements with customers that were requesting longer-term
arrangements for higher quality products. They asserted that
they could not rely on suppliers in the cash market to
change fast enough to meet their needs.
Packers also identified the perceived benefits of
marketing and production contracts for producers, based
upon their interaction with them. Access to capital was seen
as the greatest benefit to producers of marketing agreements
(rating 4.6 of 5). Reduced price risk (3.9), securing a market
outlet (3.8), ability to sell hogs at a higher price (3.6), and
the ability to secure a quality matrix (3.4) were the next
most important benefits to producer. Although the higher
price rationale was clearly evident based on experience under
contracts, especially risk-sharing contracts in 1998 and 1999
when cash market prices were lower than some contract
prices, new marketing contract offerings reflecting recent
experience will likely have lower prices in 2000. Benefits to
producers of production contracts were identified as
increasing access to capital and reducing financial risk (both
received 4.7 in a 5-point scale) followed by increased
producer income at 4.5.
Pork merchandising. In 1999, the packers responding
(with less than half of U.S. slaughter) sold 72% of their pork
on the cash market for delivery within 21 days (Table 3).
Table 2. Motivation for increased coordination of the pork supply chain, 1999a.
Marketing
Agreement
Hog
Production
Reduce plant operating costs by improving plant scheduling 3.5 4.0
Secure higher quality hogs 4.0 4.4
Secure more consistent quality of hogs 4.3 4.6
Assure food safety 3.8 4.3
Long run price risk management 3.0 3.3
Week-to-week supply/price management 3.5 3.1
Reduce costs of searching for hogs to procure 3.5 3.6
Able to purchase hogs for lower price 2.3 1.9
Capture profits from hog production 3.2
aScale of 1 to 5,1 = not important to 5 = very important.
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Table 3. Pork marketing methods, share of total sales, 1999.
%
Cash market delivery within 21 days 71.6
Forward fixed price agreement for delivery beyond 21 days 9.9
Forward formula price agreement based on current cash market 12.5
Long run agreement basis not on cash market 6.1
Only seven packers responded to questions regarding
current and future merchandising methods and motivations.
Approximately 22.5% of sales was sold on a forward or
formula price contract for delivery in the future, and 6%
was sold on a long-term agreement not tied to the cash
market. These relative shares are expected to change
dramatically by 2004 given the changes in pork
merchandising. Several packers either have or are
beginning to establish their own branded pork programs,
or are forming exclusive supplier arrangements with
retailers. Cash market sales are expected to fall by more
than half and forward pricing will grow to a larger share of
the market. Long-term agreements not tied to the cash
market are expected to double as well.
The largest single market for pork today is pork for
further processing, representing 37.5% of 1999 sales
(Table 4). These products may become branded
lunchmeats, further processed products under the processor
or retail label, or further processed products going into
food service or export markets. Branded programs by
packers, a rapidly growing market segment, make up 18%
of the current market volume. By 2004 branded programs
will represent an even larger share of pork sold. These
pork products must carry a higher degree of brand
reputation and liability and demand higher standards to
consistently satisfy end-user expectations. Within the
branded products there is expected to be a switch from
further processing by other companies to one of branded
retail and food service pork items by packers.
Thus, the motivation for increased coordination of the
pork supply chain has been driven primarily by the need
for increased quality control and consistency in the hogs
procured to meet rising demands from pork buyers and
ultimately the final consumers. Packers report a higher
level of quality and consistency from hogs under contract
or self-produced compared with those purchased on the
cash market.
Coordination advantages. Packers had a difficult
time quantifying the cost and returns advantages from hog
production or marketing contracts. However, half of the
packers responding noted that they reduced the number of
buying stations and procurement staff as they increased the
level of coordination. In some cases, the associated cost
savings have been dramatic, reducing the number of
buyers 10–20% and the number of buying stations by as
much as half. At the same time, the quality of the hogs
increased. Several noted that the lean percentage of the
hogs increased (in the range of 1.8 to 2.6% on average)
and cutting and processing yields improved significantly.
These answers are consistent with their earlier responses
that the value of coordination was in product quality,
consistency, and safety more so than plant efficiency or
lower priced hogs.
Packers were asked what they thought the impact
would be if packer ownership and/or agreements offering
packer control of hogs were abolished. They indicated that
customers and producers would not be able to get the
benefits described above. Packers would have a difficult
time enforcing the food safety and quality control
measures that they have implemented via managing their
own production or by contract supply agreements. One
packer responded that coordinated systems that have
evolved in the United States in response to consumer
requests would emerge offshore if banned in this country.
Some commented that slaughter capacity would decline
because packers are not willing to maintain their large
investments without a predictable supply of hogs. A
Table 4. Percentage of pork sales by category, 1999. 
%
Retail grocery nonbranded commodity sales 14.2
Retail grocery branded value-added products 14.2
Food service nonbranded commodity sales 7.8
Food service branded value added products 2.3
Sold to domestic processor for further processing 37.5
Export nonbranded commodity sales 6.3
Export branded value added sales 1.7
Wholesaler or broker 11.7
Other 4.5
Iowa State University                                                           Management/Economics
127
couple of firms said they would not exist without their
current arrangements and would go out of business. Most
were uncertain about the price impact of ending such
practices, but added that revoking existing agreements
would penalize progressive producers who have aligned
themselves with a processor.
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